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TRACKING BASED PRODUCT AUTHENTICATION:
CATCHING INTRUDERS IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN
  Oertel, Nina, SAP Research CEC Karlsruhe, Vincenz-Priessnitz Strasse 1, 76131 Karlsruhe,
Germany, nina.oertel@sap.com
Abstract
Product counterfeiting is a growing problem worldwide, threatening the health of consumers and
reducing company profits. By detecting and intercepting counterfeits before they reach the customer,
the problem can be mitigated. In this paper, an approach to detect counterfeit items based on their
claimed history is presented.  The necessary data is provided by tracking infrastructures that enable
the recording and retrieval of movements of individual items in the supply chain based on unique
identifiers assigned to products. If the movement history of an item deviates from the movements of
genuine items that have been learned before, a warning about a potential counterfeit is issued.
Counterfeiter activities that are possible in a tracking enabled environment are modelled and the
capability of the proposed approach to detect these strategies is assessed.
Keywords: Anti-Counterfeiting, Authentication, Supply Chain, RFID
1 INTRODUCTION
Counterfeiting is growing in terms of industries and countries affected, as well as the number of fake
goods seized by customs each year. The OECD (2007) estimates that the international trade in
counterfeit products was up to 200 billion $ in 2005. Products subject to counterfeiting range from
luxury handbags, sneakers and liquor to plane spare parts and pharmaceuticals. A counterfeit is any
product that infringes intellectual property rights such as trademarks, patents and designs. This
includes items produced in factory overruns - by the same manufacturers that produce genuine
products during normal working hours - although they do not differ in appearance from genuine
products.
Each counterfeit that is sold to a customer affects the rights holder negatively. Potential consequences
range from reducing the sales of genuine products and affecting brand value to disappointed or even
physically harmed customers (OECD 2007, Staake et al. 2008). Rights holders attempt to minimize
the negative consequences by implementing anti-counterfeiting measures that aim at cutting off
counterfeit supply and increasing the number of detected counterfeits. Product authentication
approaches, i.e., methods that aim at deciding whether a product is counterfeited or genuine, enable
stakeholders such as customers, customs and supply chain partners to check products and contribute
thus directly to an increased counterfeit detection rate. Moreover, the higher the detection rate, the less
profitable is the business for the counterfeiter as revenues decrease with each detected counterfeit,
while counterfeit production costs persist. For each counterfeiter organization there is a detection rate
that reduces the profits to zero and drives the counterfeiter out of business. Additionally, as profits
decline, counterfeiters might target products that are less well protected and thus promise larger
profits. This contributes to decreasing the supply of counterfeits.
Traditional authentication approaches, e.g., the check of holograms, base authentication on something
an item has. Authentication can also be based on something an object did in the past (Stajano 2002).
With the advent of item serialization – facilitated by radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology
- and tracking infrastructures, history information about individual items is available. Serialization
means that each item is assigned a unique identifier (UID) that can be stored on an RFID tag attached
to the item. Suitable readers are deployed in the supply chain. When an item passes, an event is
created that contains UID, time, location and further context information. Tracking infrastructures then
enable the storing and sharing of events between companies. To illustrate how this information can be
used for authentication, assume that product #123 was seen in Paris at 12:00 h, followed by a sighting
in Tokyo at 12:05 h. As item #123 cannot physically have moved over this distance in such a short
period of time, it can be concluded that the item is carrying a duplicated serial number and is therefore
probably a counterfeit.
While the potential of tracking for counterfeit detection has been recognized (Koh et al. 2003; Staake
et al. 2005; Inaba 2008), few concrete methods have been suggested so far. The general difficulty is to
specify rules operating on the item history that accurately distinguish between counterfeit and genuine
products, while keeping the specification effort manageable. The research question is thus how to
design a counterfeit detection approach based on tracking data that addresses these requirements. The
approach proposed in this paper learns rules governing the behaviour of genuine items from available
tracking data, thus eliminating the need for manual specification. The warning about potential
counterfeits is based on anomaly detection. The research thus contributes to the general aim of
developing methods and systems for analysing tracking data to support business decisions (Asif &
Mandviwalla 2005; Curtin et al. 2007).
The research method pursued is reflected in the structure of the paper: In the next chapter, related
work is reviewed and shortcomings are identified. Chapter 3 gives an overview of item tracking and
the proposed authentication approach while chapter 4 presents the methods for learning and
counterfeit detection in detail. To evaluate the approach, a model of counterfeiter behaviour in a
tracking enabled world is developed and utilized to assess the detection capabilities of the approach,
before concluding and suggesting areas for future work.
2 RELATED WORK
A large share of authentication approaches in use today are based on adding a hard to imitate, artificial
feature to the product, e.g. holograms, printing in colour-changing ink or chemical markers (OECD
2007). Authentication with these approaches requires special equipment, expertise or can only be
performed one product at a time. As the counterfeit detection rate depends not only on the detection
capability of an approach, but also on the check rate, i.e. the fraction of products that are actually
checked, approaches that do not allow for bulk authentication in the supply chain will usually result in
lower detection rates.
With the advent of RFID technology, cryptographic authentication approaches that make use of the
computational capabilities of RFID tags have been proposed (Juels 2006). Cryptographic
authentication cannot be performed with low-cost RFID tags as they have only very limited processing
power.  Once  a  method  has  been  devised  to  perfectly  imitate  a  security  feature  –  for  instance  by
hacking cryptographic RFID tags - the approach is no longer secure and counterfeits become
undetectable.
Some proposed authentication approaches utilize item serialization, i.e. the fact that each genuine item
was assigned a UID during manufacturing. It was proposed to check the validity of the serial number
of products against a database of all serial numbers assigned during manufacturing (Lei et al. 2005;
Johnston 2005). In the context of tracking infrastructures, this approach was suggested to be used for
pharmaceuticals (Koh et al. 2003). Drawbacks of this approach include the low protection against UID
copies and the possibility of counterfeiters to skim the database for valid numbers.
When more tracking data is available, the full product history can be made accessible and checked by
the prospective buyer for plausibility (Staake et al. 2005). Some types of plausibility rules are
suggested by Illic et al. (2009). For specifying individual rules, background knowledge and manual
input is required, e.g. the maximum allowed item stay time per location must be configured. The
drawback of these approaches is the effort imposed on the user for rule specification and decision.
Few approaches have been proposed that learn rules from available data. It has been suggested to learn
which product transitions between any two locations are plausible (Illic et al. 2009,  Lehtonen et al.
2007). By considering only two locations, these rules are not precise enough to detect some counterfeit
types.  The  approaches  use  a  probabilistic  decision  function  that  classifies  items  as  counterfeit  if  the
observed movements are infrequent. This poses a problem if genuine items perform unusual
movements. The Hidden-Markov-Model based approach by Lehtonen et al. (2007) detects counterfeits
based on similarity with previously detected counterfeits, but does not adapt well to new counterfeiter
strategies.
The counterfeit detection approach proposed in here extends on previous work by learning rules from
tracking data, but adds precision by considering the full context information contained in events, event
timing, and the full sequence of events instead of two consecutive events. The decision will be based
on the discovery of anomalies in event sequences. The concept of anomaly detection has been applied
in fraud and computer intrusion detection. In both domains, anomalies caused by fraudster activity are
sought among sequences of events, e.g. credit card transactions, phone calls, or system calls (Bolton &
Hand 2002). Fraud or intrusions are detected by identifying deviations from previously learned
profiles (Forrest 1997; Hilas & Sahalos 2005). A main difference to counterfeit detection is that these
systems operate on continuous event streams, while a product has a lifecycle and the corresponding
event sequence has a beginning, end, and a regular structure determined by the underlying business
processes.
3 OVERVIEW OF TRACKING-BASED COUNTERFEIT
DETECTION
3.1 Serialization and Tracking
Serialization and tracking infrastructures are necessary prerequisites for tracking-based counterfeit
detection. The UID may be stored on an RFID tag attached to a product, facilitating the simultaneous
identification of multiple items without line of sight. However, tracking is not limited to RFID tagged
products, and in principle any technology able to provide UIDs can be employed, e.g., printed 2D-
barcodes. To enable tracking, suitable reading devices need to be distributed in the supply chain that
capture events when items pass. The attributes to be contained in an event are usually determined by
the tracking infrastructure. For example, the attributes (UID, time, location, business step) specify a
simple event format. An event instance contains values in the domain of each attribute, e.g., (123,
12:00 h, Paris Shop A, Sale). In a business setting, further useful attributes include the organizational
unit, associated business transactions, lifecycle information, and aggregation with other products. The
captured  events  are  submitted  to  a  local  database  –  the  repository  -  for  future  reference.  A  tracking
infrastructure provides methods for finding and assembling the events pertaining to a specific item,
which are usually distributed over multiple repositories and even multiple companies.
The trace of an item is defined as the sequence of all events containing the item UID ordered by their
timestamp. The trace may not only contain information about the physical movements from location to
location, but also about the underlying business processes and the actions performed. This is illustrated
by the traces of two sample products in table 1. Both items are produced in Lyon and then delivered to
a distribution centre in Paris. While item #123 does not pass the quality control and is therefore
disposed of, item #126 is shipped to a retailer and subsequently sold to a customer.
UID Event Time Location Step
123 1 12.08.2008;12:00 h Lyon Plant A Production
123 2 22.08.2008;12:00 h Paris Distribution Centre  A Receiving
123 3 22.08.2008;14:00 h Paris Distribution Centre   A Quality Control
123 4 22.08.2008;15:00 h Paris Distribution Centre  A Disposal
126 1 23.08.2008;11:00 h Lyon Plant A Production
126 2 25.08.2008;12:00 h Paris Distribution Centre  A Receiving
126 3 26.08.2008;12:00 h Paris Distribution Centre  A Shipping
126 4 26.08.2008;14:00 h Paris Shop B Receiving
126 5 27.08.2008; 11:00 h Paris Ship B Sale
Table 1. Sample traces of two items represented in an event format that contains the two
context attributes location (represented by city and facility) and process step.
Serialization and tracking are not yet in widespread use, although trials of limited scope are
performed. However, some product types, e.g., luxury watches or plane parts, already carry serial
numbers and proprietary systems are used to track them over their lifecycle. Standardization of
tracking infrastructures is under way, most notably in the context of the EPCglobal framework, a set of
standards targeted at enabling an interorganisational, distributed tracking infrastructure based on
globally unique identifiers (EPCglobal 2007b). Part of the framework is also a specification of an
event format suitable for a business context (EPCglobal 2007a). Government mandates requiring
serialization and tracking for high risk products such as pharmaceuticals might further foster the
adoption of tracking based systems (e.g. FDA 2004).
The event format presupposed for the proposed counterfeit detection approach is generic in so far as
only a UID, timestamp and at least one recurring attribute is required. The approach is thus
independent from a specific standard such as the EPCglobal framework and can be adapted to the
event format utilized by any tracking system that fulfils these basic requirements.
3.2 Components of the Authentication Approach
An overview of the components of the proposed anti-counterfeiting approach and the data flows
between them is  given in figure 1.  The model  learner  takes as  input  a  set  of  sample traces from the
tracking repository and infers from them the rules according to which items move. The output is a
model of the supply chain containing all rules. The learning step can be repeated periodically to update
the model with current traces. For every product type, a separate model should be constructed, so that
the trace of a handbag is not compared to traces of car brakes. The Electronic Product Code (EPC)
standard contains the product type identifier as prefix in the UID, followed by the actual serial number
of the item (EPCglobal 2007b). For all products identified by EPCs and UIDs constructed in a similar
manner, the product type is directly available from the events.
The quality of the learned model depends on the quality of the traces contained in the sample. The
sample must fulfil the following requirements:
The traces should cover all potential product movements, including legitimate exceptions in
product routing or process execution, as well as seasonal variations.
All traces must belong to genuine items, otherwise the movements exhibited by counterfeit
products will later be accepted as normal
To fulfil the first requirement, the sample size must be chosen large enough and cover a sufficiently
long period of time. Furthermore, commonly used data cleansing techniques aimed at filtering out
outliers and exceptions based on low observation frequencies should not be applied. The problem of
separating events triggered by legitimate users from events generated by intruders is well known from
the intrusion detection domain. But unlike intrusion detection, which operates in the virtual space,
counterfeit detection deals with actual physical objects. This allows for authenticating items with non-
tracking based approaches, e.g., relying on security features or expert judgement. It is also possible to
send designated test items from the manufacturer through the supply chain, authenticating them at
each read point, and basing the sample on their traces. Only traces of items confirmed to be genuine
should be admitted to the sample. Another possibility to ensure that only traces of genuine items are
contained is to visualize the model with a suitable representation (e.g. Illic et al. 2009, Hoffman et al.
2008) and have it inspected by an expert.
The decider takes the trace of the product to be authenticated, the learned model and possibly also the
position at which the authentication is performed as input. Position information is required because
items might also be authenticated at intermediate points in the supply chain. In fact, every capturing of
an event may be coupled with authentication, thus leading to a high check rate. This allows to
intercept counterfeits early, before they reach the customer. The position information can be supplied
by the user, the reading device or by an authentication service. The decider compares the trace
reported by the item to be authenticated with the supply chain model (up to the authentication
position) and computes the authentication result. If a mismatch is found, the item is a potential
counterfeit  and  a  warning  is  issued.  If  no  anomaly  is  detected,  the  trace  is  reported  to  be  plausible.
These cautious results are justified because even for plausible traces, it cannot be guaranteed that the
item is genuine. Likewise, deviating traces might be caused by errors, e.g., wrong item routing and
need not necessarily be caused by counterfeiting activity. The detailed algorithms used by the decider












Figure 1. Overview of the components and data flow of the proposed authentication approach.
4  AUTHENTICATION APPROACH
4.1 Representing Item Movements
The supply chain model shall in a general yet precise way describe the movements of genuine items.
The movements as represented in tracking data are characterized by
the events contained in the trace,
the sequence of events, and
the timing of events in the trace relative to each other.
Before describing how the model is constructed from sample traces, it will be described how each of
these three concepts is represented.
The attributes specified by an event format can be divided into recurring and non-recurring attributes.
The values of recurring attributes can be expected to be observed for further items, while the values of
non-recurring attributes have a limited lifespan. The UID – bound by the lifetime of an item - and the
event time – being monotonically increasing – are non-recurring. In the above example (table 1), the
attributes location and process step are recurring. As their values are determined by the underlying
business processes and the design of the supply chain, the values can be expected to be observed also
for future items. The set of recurring attributes can be determined by the user (as this is necessary only
once per event format) or automatically by scanning the sample traces for attribute values recurring
over the sample period. A unique combination of values of recurring attributes will be called a station.
Examples of stations are (Lyon Plant A, Production) or (Paris Distribution Centre A, Receiving). Each
event maps to exactly one station, while a station represents many different events.
To accurately represent an event, its position in the trace and prior events must be considered in
addition to the attribute values contained. Take for example a process in which items are shipped from
a central distribution centre to shops, and, in case they are not sold, sent back to the distribution centre
and shipped to outlet centres. Some items will pass the shipping ramp - the station (Paris Distribution
Centre A, Shipping )- twice, but depending on the position in the trace, the legitimate next event will
vary, being either the reception at a shop or at an outlet centre. Therefore, the concept of a node is
introduced to represent an event at a specific position in the trace. Each node references a station that
indicates which attribute values are contained in the event represented by the node. Multiple nodes
(representing events at different positions in the trace) may reference the same station.
The ordering of events in a trace is represented by transitions between nodes. A transition is a directed
arc from a start node to a successor node. The timing of events relative to each other is given by the
difference in the timestamps of two consecutive events in a trace. The time is therefore a property of
the transition between event representations. When considering multiple items that share the same
transition in their traces, the average, minimum and maximum transition times are  computed for  the
transition.
4.2 Constructing the supply chain model
Given stations, nodes, transitions and transition times as building blocks, a model of the legitimate
behaviour of items in the supply chain can be constructed from a set of traces of genuine items. Put
shortly, the model is built up by transforming each trace into a sequence of nodes connected by
transitions and then merging sequences sharing the same prefix together. The resulting model is a tree
shaped directed acyclic graph containing nodes and transitions, and an additional look-up table
mapping the nodes to stations. The model represents all prior observed sequences of movements of
genuine items.
The graph is initialized with a root node and a terminal node. The root node is a common predecessor
of all nodes representing potential first events in traces. The root node connects for example the traces
of items produced in Lyon and items produced in Tokyo. The terminal node serves as a common end
node for all traces. It is needed to mark the potential last events so that the completeness of traces can
be checked.
Each trace in the input set is processed in the following way: If the station corresponding to the current
event is not yet contained in the model, the station is created and added. Starting with the root node of
the graph as the current node, it is tested whether the station corresponding to the current event is
referenced by one of the successor nodes. Successor nodes are all nodes to which a transition exists. If
such a node is found, the average, minimum and maximum time of the transition between the current
and the successor node are updated with the difference between the timestamps of the last and current
event from the trace. If no suitable successor node is found, a new successor node referencing the
station corresponding to the current event is created. A transition between the current and the
successor node is added and the transition times are initialized. As long as there are more events in the
trace, the successor node then becomes the new current node and the next event from the trace is
processed. If the last event of a trace is reached, a transition to the terminal node is added to indicate
that the trace ends at this point.
Figure 2 presents a sample supply chain model learned by this algorithm. Stations are labelled with
characters, while nodes are labelled with consecutive integers. The model has the following properties:
All direct successors of the root node represent valid start events of traces, the predecessors of the
terminal node represent valid last events. The transition from node 8 to the terminal node indicates that
(A,  B,  F,  B)  is  a  valid  trace.  Although  the  node  pairs  4;5  and  8;9  reference  the  same  stations,  the
preceding nodes 3 respectively 7 influence not only the transition times between stations B and D, but
also the set of valid successor events (represented by E respectively G). It is important to note that
events may not only have implications for the directly following event, but also on events that happen
at any later point in time. These higher level dependencies (spanning multiple events) are commonly
found in supply chains. For example, an unpacking event is only valid if items have been packed
earlier. Nodes 12-14 showcase a potential repetition of events. By representing events as nodes it is
possible to determine how many repetitions are allowed (maximum 3 in the example) and how








































































































Figure 2. Graphical and partial data representation of a supply chain model.
4.3 Item Authentication
The decider classifies a trace as plausible if its trace conforms to the supply chain model. If this is the
case, a similar trace has been observed for a genuine item, rendering the item in question unsuspicious.
For a trace to conform to the model, the following conditions must be fulfilled:
All events in the trace must be valid, i.e., for each event the corresponding station must be
contained in the model
The events in the trace must form a valid sequence, i.e., there exists a path in the graph on which all
stations corresponding to events in the trace are connected by transitions
The trace must be complete, i.e., the path starts at the root node and ends at the terminal node
The timing of events in the trace is plausible, i.e. the time difference between any two events is
within reasonable boundaries of the time span observed for the corresponding transition
If any of these conditions is violated, the item is classified as a potential counterfeit. The four types of
mismatches are illustrated in figure 3. The completeness condition needs to be relaxed if an item is
authenticated at an intermediate point in the supply chain. For example, if all traces represented by the
model end at a shop, but an item is authenticated at a distribution centre, it will unjustifiably be
classified as counterfeit. Therefore, if no information about the authentication context is available, the
test for a trace ending with the terminal node may be skipped. In case some information about the
authentication context is available, transitions from all stations matching with this context to the
terminal node should be added temporarily to the supply chain model. The context information may
correspond directly to a station, e.g., authentication is performed at the reader located at (Paris
Distribution Centre A, Shipping) or only to some attribute values contained in a station, e.g., (?, Sale).
The decider processes the current trace as follows: For each event, the corresponding station is
computed and searched in the look-up table. If the station is not found, the item is classified as
potential counterfeit. Starting with the root node in the model, a node referencing the current station is
searched among the successor nodes. If no such node exists, the item is again a potential counterfeit. If
a valid successor node is found, the difference of event times of the last and current event is compared
to the corresponding transition time. We propose to check whether the event time difference is smaller
than the minimum or greater than the maximum transition time, each extended by a small margin to
account for minor variations in event timing. The extension may, e.g., be set to 10% of the difference
between average time and minimum time for the lower bound and to 10% of the difference between
maximum and average time for the upper bound. If all tests are passed, the successor node becomes
the new current node and the next event is processed. If the last event in the trace is reached, it is
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Figure 3. Mismatch between supply chain model and trace: a) invalid event, b) incomplete
trace, c) invalid transition, d) invalid transition time
5 EVALUATION
The information about counterfeiter strategies and the routes on which counterfeited items are put on
the market is limited due to the clandestine nature of the operations. To assess the detection
capabilities of the proposed approach, it is moreover necessary to systematically explore the
possibilities of counterfeiters in tracking enabled supply chains, for which the available data is not
suitable. A model of the potential counterfeiter activities is therefore suggested, the effect of the
behaviour on item traces is analyzed and used to evaluate the detection capabilities of the proposed
approach. In future work, it is planned to computationally verify the results of the analysis by
simulating the modelled counterfeiter strategies and normal supply chain operations and assessing the
detection capability.
Suppose all items of a certain type are equipped with UIDs and a tracking infrastructure covering the
supply chain is in place. The first challenge for the counterfeiter is to obtain UIDs for the counterfeited
goods. One option is to completely omit the UID, but this strategy should be easily detectable during
authentication. For actually obtaining a UID, the options include guessing identifiers, transferring the
UIDs of genuine products to counterfeits or copying the UIDs found on genuine products. If identifiers
are  guessed  randomly,  the  resulting  UID may  in  rare  cases  be  a  duplicate  of  a  valid  UID,  but  most
likely it will be invalid, i.e., no genuine item carrying the same UID exists. To transfer UIDs,
counterfeiters  may  remove  RFID tags  from genuine  items  and  reapply  them to  counterfeits,  or  they
may seek access to UIDs of disposed products and reuse them. Any UID found on a counterfeit will
have at least one of these properties: it is invalid, has been transferred or is duplicated.
The counterfeited items must be distributed, either by injecting them in licit channels or by distributing
them outside of the legitimate supply chain, for example by smuggling, selling on flea markets or
through online shops. For the resulting item trace, it is important whether there are read points on the
path of the item or not. Illicit distribution channels are likely to contain no read points and thus be
invisible, while licit channels can be assumed to be visible. The combined effects of UID and
distribution strategies on traces will now be analyzed. The various scenarios are illustrated in figure 4.
An item with an invalid UID that is traded completely through invisible channels has no trace. This
can be detected immediately. Items with invalid UIDs that are injected in the licit supply chains will
appear suddenly after the injection point (figure 4a). Some events at the beginning of their trace are
missing and the trace will fail the completeness check as the first event in the trace is not a successor
of the root node in the model. However, if a counterfeiter manages to inject counterfeits in the licit
channel before the first event is usually captured – which is most likely in the production facilities of
genuine items – and it is ensured that this manipulation does not distort the further routing of the item,
the  resulting  trace  will  fully  correspond  to  the  model  and  the  counterfeit  will  not  be  detected.  If
distortions surface later in the trace (not only in terms of location but also in terms of wrong business
steps or missing transaction information) the counterfeit will also be detected (figure 4g). An
additional check for UID validity offered by the rights holder and strict number management can
mitigate this threat
In case a counterfeit carries a transferred UID (valid and unique), the events in the trace were
triggered  by  the  movements  of  two  items:  Up  to  the  point  in  time  when  the  UID was  removed,  the
events were created for a genuine product and the beginning of the trace will conform to the model.
After that, the counterfeit carries the stolen UID. Depending on the distribution of the counterfeit, the
following possibilities for the continuation of the trace exist: If the counterfeit is distributed outside
visible channels, the trace ends early (figure 4b). Unless the last captured event was a valid terminal
event, the completeness check will fail. If the counterfeit is injected in the licit supply chain, the
sequence of events will only be valid if the counterfeit directly replaces a genuine item, the time
needed for the product exchange does not lead to a time threshold violation and the manipulation does
not lead to distortions on the future path of the counterfeit. If the injection is not a direct replacement
but takes place further upstream (figure 4c), downstream (figure 4d) or in another branch of the supply
chain (figure 4e), the model will contain no transition allowing this sequence of events. If the
replacement leads to an exceeded transition time, invalid transitions or events later in the trace (figure
4g), it will also be detected.
If counterfeits with duplicate UIDs are distributed through invisible channels, they can be detected as
long as the trace of the genuine item carrying the UID is not complete (figure 4a). If the duplicates are
injected in the licit supply chain, the trace that is retrieved for the UID is a mix of all sub-traces
created by the multiple items carrying the same UID (figure 4f). As soon as the first item with a copied
UID is injected in the supply chain, this will result in an invalid trace as a transition between the last
event captured for the genuine item (from which the UID was copied) and the first event triggered by
the counterfeit is missing. However, if the counterfeiter manages to inject the counterfeit at exactly the
station where the next event for the genuine item is expected, the injection will remain undetected, but
only as long as the genuine item does not arrive at this station. As soon as the genuine item triggers the
next event, the trace becomes invalid as a transition is missing and the counterfeit can be detected at
the next  sighting.  Note that  in  this  specific  case,  a  genuine item will  be classified as  counterfeit.  As
counterfeiters  will  probably  put  the  same  copied  UID  on  many  items,  it  may  be  acceptable  to


















































Figure 4. Consequences of counterfeiter strategies on trace data
From this  analysis  follows  that  a  wide  range  of  potential  counterfeiter  activities  result  in  traces  that
deviate from the traces of genuine items and can thus be detected by the proposed approach. Only few
options are open to counterfeiters to “construct” traces for counterfeits that arte indistinguishable from
the traces of originals. Moreover, each of these remaining options requires considerable effort in terms
of knowledge and access to the licit supply chain.
Tracking based authentication enables a high check rate compared to traditional authentication, as
automated event capturing can be combined with authentication and, in case of RFID, this can be done
for many items simultaneously. The possibility to check items by their UID might also be extended to
end customers, further increasing the check rate. The detection capability of the approach for low
effort strategies such as identifier guessing without access to the licit supply chain is given, as well as
the capability to detect the strategy most prevalent today - the distribution through illicit channels.
Additional safeguards such as random inspection of inconspicuous goods, investigation of the sources
of detected counterfeits facilitated by tracking data and UID validation may help in limiting the
number of counterfeits that cannot be spotted with the proposed approach. In combination with a high
check rate, this may result in detection rates that are high enough to drive counterfeiters out of
business or make them target more vulnerable products. In any case, tracking based counterfeit
detection will raise the bar for counterfeiters and each detected counterfeit decreases the overall
negative consequences of counterfeiting.
6 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, a counterfeit detection approach based on item serialization and tracking was proposed.
Rules governing the behaviour of genuine items are learned from available tracking data. The traces of
items to be authenticated are compared to these rules and a counterfeit warning is issued if no match
with  a  rule  is  found  and  the  trace  is  thus  distorted.  By  modelling  the  potential  behaviour  of
counterfeiters in a tracking enabled environment and analyzing the consequences of these actions on
item  traces,  it  could  be  shown  that  the  approach  is  able  to  detect  a  large  share  of  the  modelled
strategies. It was also analyzed which strategies are undetectable by the suggested approach as they
result in traces that are indistinguishable from the traces of originals. These strategies have in common
that  they  require  prerequisites  from  the  counterfeiter  such  as  access  to  the  licit  supply  chain  and
knowledge about the current location of items. It was argued that the combination of the detection
capability and the attainable check rate may lead to favourable counterfeit detection rates, particularly
in comparison with traditional authentication approaches.
As some organization are already tracking items or are preparing to do so in the future, they may wish
to consider the suggested approach to discourage counterfeiting of their products. Organizations that
are affected severely by counterfeiting might  assess  the suitability  of  the approach for  their  specific
context. Of particular importance is the trust that companies have in their supply chain partners, their
expected willingness to participate in such an approach, as well as the current and expected future
strategies of counterfeiters.
It was demonstrated that counterfeit detection is a problem that is in principle amenable to information
technology support, but before tracking based counterfeit detection can be applied in practice, many
questions remain to be answered. A major concern that could not be addressed in this paper is data
sharing in the supply chain. Organizations are generally reluctant to reveal fine-grained and potentially
sensitive business data as contained in tracking events. Data access is a prerequisite for model learning
and authentication, so a challenge is to enable these functionalities with minimal or no divulgence of
critical information. To address this issue, concepts from the area of privacy preserving data mining
and secure multi party computation may be assessed. Furthermore, mechanisms for avoiding high
false positive rates are required, as a large share of genuine items for which a counterfeit warning is
issued might hamper the practical applicability of the approach. Given current rates of read errors in
RFID based systems, issuing a warning for any deviation might be a too harsh decision criteria in real
world operations and the decision logic may be further refined to account for this requirement.
Operator models need to developed, e.g., a service hosted by trusted third party, the tracking
infrastructure provider, or a distributed model learning by every supply chain participant. The
enforceability, cost and benefit distribution in various supply chain settings might also be explored.
How the approach can be extended to end customers, the security implications of this step and user
acceptance of a mobile or web based authentication system are further areas of interest.
The proposed tracking based authentication approach might prove to be a useful complement to
traditional authentication approaches. Given item serialization and tracking are in place as
prerequisites, the proposed approach may help to increase security in the supply chain and to lessen
the negative consequences on health and finances caused by counterfeiting.
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